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VI. C. 4

SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT

Negotiations, 1967 - 1968

HISTORY OF CONTACTS

GROUP-1

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AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED
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LAWS, TITLE 18 U.S.C. SECTIONS 793 AND 794.
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the Norwegian Ambassador in Peking (Algard) were probably the most reliable of all. Algard seems to have been a careful note-taker, and his messages look like he was using Hanoi turns of phrases. Many of the points made by Algard were subsequently borne out by other contacts and by public DRV statements.

Because Norway, unlike Sweden, was not visibly more friendly to the DRV than to the U.S., Hanoi did not seem really comfortable in activating this channel into a major one. On November 2, 1967, Loan hinted to Algard that Norway's role was "not neutral" and that Norway was "indirectly involved." Norwegian domestic politics were, like those in Sweden, vehemently anti-American on the Vietnam issue, but this never seemed to get in the way of objective Norwegian Government reporting. Unlike the Swedes, the Norwegians did not press us hard on the bombing issue.

The exchanges among the PENNSYLVANIA participants (two unofficial Frenchmen, Mai Van Bo and Henry Kissinger) seemed to have been handled with great care and accuracy. While the two Frenchmen, Marcovich and Aubrac, were clearly committed to getting the U.S. to stop the bombing, there is no evidence that their reporting, or message carrying, was adversely affected. Kissinger for the U.S. handled the play with consummate skill, clarifying points and making interpretations that could lead to a continuing dialogue. Both Hanoi and Washington treated this channel as a major one, and yet little was accomplished except the clarification of the U.S. "no advantage" formula. This clarification was to be lost in subsequent reformulations of the U.S. position on "no advantage."

The Italians were old hands at playing the role of intermediary. Their role in MARIGOLD had been respected by both sides. They were not pushy about interposing themselves between Hanoi and Washington and always stood ready to break off contacts if the U.S. so desired. It is important to remember that in Killy the North Vietnamese sought out d'Orlandi (according to d'Orlandi) and not the reverse. The Killy contacts were between d'Orlandi and the DRV Ambassador in Prague, Suu. It is also important to remember that d'Orlandi had a very special view about the role of intermediation. Unlike all the other go-betweens who were interested almost solely in a cessation of U.S. bombing, d'Orlandi's approach was to focus on terms of final settlement. Only when the future of South Vietnam could be foreseen, d'Orlandi argued, would the two sides sit down and genuinely and seriously negotiate.

DRV (1/4/68). The Swedes were told of DRV concern that "no advantage" would "leave our brothers in the South unprotected."

STOCKHOLM 662 to SecState (SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
January 4, 1968. Ref: Stockholm 649.

"3. Oberg saw Charge Vu Bach Mai (Oberg's spelling) Dec 21 and handed over paper described Para 2A. Paper had been translated into French; illustrative examples Para 7 State 73693 were also given in English.

"4. NVN Charge raised three points which Oberg on instructions refused to discuss saying that Swedes had this paper from US aide and that Swedes not competent go beyond what was in paper.

"5. Three points NVN Charge raised were:

A. Did Swedes have any suggestions on how to describe bombing pause?

B. On question of flow of material in no-advantage situation Charge said 'we cannot leave our brothers in the South unprotected.' It was not clear to Oberg whether he was referring to NLF in South Vietnam or to supplies to NVN troops north of DMZ. (Oberg commented that in his contacts NVN representatives never referred presence NVN troops in South Vietnam.)

C. On question seriousness of negotiations Charge said this was unclear to him. In any negotiation both sides started from positions widely apart and with quite different aims. In such cases there would be different interpretation of 'serious or productive.'"

DRV (1/5/68). The Rumanians reported that Trinh made clear to them that the condition for talks was an "unconditional" but not "permanent" bombing cessation. They also claimed that the DRV would not insist on U.S. acceptance of the 4 Points as the basis for negotiations; each side would come with its own views.

"Material in quotation marks was read slowly and carefully by Macoyescu.

"Here is the answer to the question that you asked Mr. Harriman. From this point on there is a passage which in the text is in quotation marks.

'We affirm the following. If the USG really wants discussions with the Government of the DRV it should first unconditionally cease bombing and any other act of war against the DRV. After the unconditional cessation of all bombing and of any other U.S. act of war against the DRV and at the end of an appropriate period of time the government of the DRV will enter into serious discussions with the USG.'

"While he was reading this paragraph I stopped him and told him comrade Minister when I mentioned cessation I said final and unconditional. Trinh looked at me and reread the sentence. I said I mentioned 'final and unconditional cessation.' He reread the sentence again. I interrupted for the third time. May I understand you are no longer speaking of final cessation. His answer was that publicly we may continue to mention it but with a view to negotiations. What I have said is our position.

"I asked him whether the Government of Romania is authorized to pass this communication to the USG. He said yes. He repeated it but he said to retain spirit of the message."

Harriman said that the Trinh public statement was much the same as the M & I message, but that the M & I statement placed more emphasis on the acceptance of the four points as a basis of negotiations. M said that he did not establish any connection between his visit to Washington, unknown to Hanoi, and the Trinh public statement. Harriman argued that "there must be some connection." M responded that he did not believe there was a contradiction between the two messages:

"In the public statement it says the basis for negotiations is the four points, but in private conversation they say we will come with this basis but the U.S. side, we expect, will come with its own point of view. They especially said this."

Harriman then questioned whether it was the DRV view that discussions will be fruitful only if we accept their four points. M responded:

"That is not the impression I gained from my discussions. They will come with their claims but would have to negotiate on what the U.S. puts forth. They said this specifically."

With respect to the timing of discussions, M said that Trinh stated there could be no contacts "as long as U.S. acts of war continue, ... but as soon as bombing and other acts of aggression against North Vietnamese cease, we are prepared to receive anybody...." Trinh added: "We shall consider these contacts as normal diplomatic activities. The American representative will be received by our diplomats at their suggestion."

Harriman questioned further on the timing, specifically as to the meaning of "after a suitable length of time." Here, M retreated to the DRV text--"the appropriate and necessary period of time." M explained this as a period in which

"they will try to test (I don't know by what means) the sincerity of your intentions--your wish to have discussions. I could not deduce the period, but I do not think it will be too long. If an understanding is reached that you stop, at a certain established period, discussions, not negotiations, will take place."

* * *

M then read from a document:

"As long as the US acts of war go on we cannot have any contacts with them. As soon as they cease the bombings and discontinue the acts of aggression we shall be prepared to receive any person, even a representative of the United States, who may wish to make known to us the American point of view or to get informed on our viewpoint. We shall regard these future contacts as normal diplomatic activity. The American representatives will be received by our representatives at the former's suggestion."

* * *

"1. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has communicated to the United States Government this statement of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam position:

"If the United States Government really wants discussions with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam it should first unconditionally cease bombing and any other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. After the unconditional cessation of all bombing and of any other United States act of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and at the end of an appropriate period of time the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will enter into serious discussions with the United States Government."

* * *

faith its position on any matter. 'Prompt' of course refers to a willingness by Hanoi to begin discussions with the US immediately after cessation of bombing.

"It is worth noting that Hanoi is unwilling to give a clear response to questions as to the length of time between a US bombing cessation and the beginning of talks. If Hanoi were serious in desiring talks then surely its response would have been one of unequivocal readiness to begin immediately.

"The US evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into account Hanoi's actions as well as its words. The unprecedented offensive against most of South Viet-Nam's urban centers, which Hanoi treacherously launched in the midst of the traditional Tet holidays, causing widespread civilian casualties and suffering, was made notwithstanding the fact that we were still exploring with Hanoi its position through diplomatic channels, and that we had exercised restraint in bombing targets in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. In this context, we cannot but weigh Hanoi's words with great skepticism and caution. These actions carry a harsh political message.

"The US favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi's position. We shall continue to evaluate all information and to pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us closer to the resolution of this conflict through serious negotiations."

(State 118092)

DRV (2/24/68). "All other acts of war" was defined to mean that "no airplanes were permitted to fly over DRV territory."

"Mr. Chan repeated the statement of his Foreign Minister of January 1967 and of the 29th of December 1967. He thus repeated that negotiations would begin as soon as the United States had proved that it has stopped all bombardments and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He specified 'all other acts of war' to mean that no airplanes were permitted to fly over DRV territory and no naval vessels were to have their guns or other weapons directed against DRV territory after that had been done, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would negotiate with the United States about relevant questions. The Ambassador in this connection

"Answer: The Democratic Republic of Vietnam is an independent and sovereign country some 10,000 miles away from the United States, and has done no harm whatsoever to it. The unwarranted U.S. bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is an impudent act of aggression. The United States must bring it to an end.

"To ask for 'reciprocity' as a condition, or 'restraint' as a price, is nothing but a trick to blur the distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression. The United States has shown no 'restraint' in using its huge war machine against a small country, and still demands that we should show 'restraint' and should not exercise our sacred rights to defend our fatherland. This is pure nonsense."

.....

"Question: In its 3 April statement, your government declared 'its readiness to appoint its representative to contact a U.S. representative with a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so that the talks may start.' Mr. Minister, what will be the rank of your representative? When and where will he make contact with the U.S. representative? When and where will the formal talks between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States start, and at what level?

Answer: A representative with ambassadorial rank of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is ready to make contact with a representative of the U.S. Government in Phnom Penh or in another place to be mutually agreed upon. In the course of this contact, the American side will specify the date when the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will become effective; then the two sides will reach agreement on the date, place, and level of the formal talks between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States."

.....

DRV (5/3/68). The DRV appointed Xuan Thuy as its representative to enter "formal talks" with the US in Paris.

"... the DRV Government is of the view that the formal talks between Hanoi and Washington should be held immediately. The DRV Government has decided to appoint Minister Xuan Thuy as its representative to enter into formal talks with the U.S. Government's representative, to determine with the U.S. side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the DRV, and then hold talks on other problems of concern to the two sides."

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OSLO 3570 - Summary of Ambassador Algard's visit to Hanoi, March 3-10:

"7. The Foreign Minister underlined also that the North Vietnamese 4-point program must be the foundation for a political resolution of the conflict. Apart from what concerned the stopping of the bombing and cessation of the acts of war against North Vietnam, he did not set matters forth in such a way that the United States beforehand must accept the entire 4-point program. He did not say anything on the point of time for American withdrawal but said that was a question which must be handled at the conference table. Nor would he say anything on how the reunification problem would be settled nor how long it would take but he repeated that first there must be a political solution in South Vietnam and referred to the NLF program which assumed a separate South Vietnamese state for the immediate future. Insofar as it concerned a political solution for South Vietnam, the Foreign Minister repeated the North Vietnamese position that this was a question which must be discussed with the NLF and that Hanoi cannot speak on behalf of South Vietnam. He underlined very strongly that recent events in South Vietnam had shown that the regime in Saigon was totally without political basis but at the same time events made clear that there was a possibility of cooperation between the NLF and other political groups. However he did not go into detail on this point."

"The United States is willing to stop the aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam with the understanding that this will lead promptly to productive discussions between representatives of the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam looking toward a resolution of the issues between them. While discussions proceed either with public knowledge or secretly, the United States would assume that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation. Any such move on the part of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam would obviously be inconsistent with the movement toward resolution of the issues between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam which the discussions are intended to achieve.

The United States is prepared to enter into discussions either openly or secretly. It would seem, however, that a total cessation of the bombing is inconsistent with keeping secret the fact that discussions are taking place. Accordingly, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam may prefer to consider the alternative of a cutback in the magnitude or scope of the bombing while secret discussions are in progress.

The United States is ready to have immediate private contact with the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to explore the above approach or any suggestions the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam might wish to propose in the same direction."

According to M and A, Bo's cable to Hanoi, after transmitting the above message in English and French texts, noted that texts were confirmed by Cooper and that both Kissinger and Cooper had stated they were prepared at a very high level of the USG and approved by the President. A message sent to Hanoi also included the following points which had been made by Kissinger according to M and A:

- (a) The US is handling this problem confidentially and requests Hanoi to do likewise;
- (b) The US is particularly interested in the possibility that the DRV envisages direct secret discussions;
- (c) The attacks on the dikes were accidental;
- (d) The US requested message to be brought to the attention of Ham Van Dong as soon as possible;

Memo To: Len Weinglass

From Sam Hurst

Volume VI.C.4 Settlement of the Conflict; Negotiations, 1967-1968
History of Contacts

"Since mid 1964 there was a halting but gradual diplomatic movement by both North Vietnam and the United States toward a negotiated settlement." (1) For four years, from 1964-1968 the Pentagon Papers detail five major negotiation tracks; the Rumanians (Packers), Swedish (Aspen), Norwegian (Ohio), Marcovich/Aubrac/Kissinger/ (Pennsylvania), and Italian (Killy). At varying times each track represented an optimistic front which might lead to peace. Inevitably, each track dissipated and atrophied from unuse or conscious rejection.

The Rumanian track was limited by the fact that rather than being neutral go-betweens the Rumanians were "quite frank about admitting that they were only interested in stopping the US bombing." (3)

The Swedish track, although offering persistent access to the DRV, was closed by the US because of the obvious solidarity of Swedish domestic politics with the struggle of the Vietnamese people.

...the Russell War Crimes Tribunal began to hold its hearings in July 1967; and the government of Sweden kept hinting about establishing consular relations with Hanoi. Swedish/GVN relations began to strain, and in the spring and summer of 1967, Sweden reduced the level of its diplomatic representation in Saigon. Finally, on November 4, 1967, the Government of Sweden publicly denounced US-Vietnam policy.

The US, because of the above, never put much stock in the Swedish messages, and this track never became an important one. (3)

The Norwegian track, the Italian track, and the efforts of Aubrac, Marcovich and Kissinger, proved the most valuable and workable channels of communication between the DRV and the US, though neither of these three could be pointed to as the actual or single track which led to Paris. More appropriately, the path to Paris was a labyrinthian course of interwoven and overlapping efforts.

The cornerstone of US diplomacy was that regardless of the indigenous strength of the NLF, the DRV controlled the military affairs in the South. To stall and inhibit the NLF the US would have to negotiate with the DRV. Our 1965-1966 diplomatic position toward the NLF was that;

...the NLF had no role 'as a right' in South Vietnam and that we could not guarantee a role for it before elections, because to do so would be contrary to self-determination. (8)

We (USA) could not recognize them (NLF) as a government or as the sole representative for the people of Vietnam. We will be prepared to accept anything which the GSV is ready to accept. (40, through the Ohio track)

The Thieu administration reached to the belly of the matter in June of 1965 by defining the war as a civil war between the GVN and the DRV. Thieu's four points stated "...the Hanoi Communist regime must dissolve all puppet organizations it has formed in SVN under the names of 'Front for the Liberation of the South', 'Liberation Radio', and the 'Peoples Revolutionary Party'. " (8)

The position of the DRV toward the NLF was one of both

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solidarity and tenderness. The DRV persisted in the belief that negotiations concerning the South could only be initiated in the presence of the NLF representatives. To further define the independence of the Liberation Front, the DRV stressed that though volunteers from the North had joined the NLF there were no regular PAVN Divisions in the South.

According to the Pentagon analyst, "The prime war aim of the communists is establishing legitimacy for the NLF while undercutting that of the GVN." (6)

The essential flexibility within the DRV position as opposed to the GVN position was enunciated by Foreign Minister Trinh on November 11, 1966; "The NLF must be accepted by the USG as one of the spokesmen for the South Vietnamese people and...the most valid one." (20)

The DRV recognized that the GVN was a political factor in the South, and while it was confident of the popular support for the NLF, it recognized the diplomatic necessity of advocating a coalition government in the South.

From the outset, the communists' carrot has been their willingness to see 'non-communists' included in the government or at the conference table. (6)

(November 11, 1966 through the Aspen track) Burchett (Australian journalist), claiming to reflect the views of senior DRV and NLF officials, reported that Ky and Thieu would not be acceptable in a coalition, but 'some members of their cabinet or...previous Saigon governments 'might be'. (7)

On June 18, 1964, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong met with Canadian ICC member J.B. Seaborne to reveal the official

position of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam toward the South.

President Ho Chi Minh has explained what we mean by a just solution. First, it requires an American withdrawal from Indochina. Secondly, it means that the affairs of the South must be arranged by the people of the South. It must provide for the participation of the Liberation Front. No other group represents the broad wishes of the people. The programme of the Front is the best one possible. There must be peace and neutrality for South Vietnam, neutrality in the Cambodian manner. (3)

In November, 1966, the Swedish track turned up the following DRV/NLF position;

The creation of a national coalition government, founded on a very broad basis and including all political and religious groupings as well as all social classes genuinely desiring to achieve national independence. (20)

As an extension of our general concern over the popular strength of the NLF, the US opposed a coalition government as vigorously as it opposed neutralization because of the fear that the NLF would quickly undermine the other elements of the government.

In his report to the US Government, Seaborne noted that he had discussed US fears in this area with Pham Van Dong.

My fear was that coalition would soon be taken over by Front as had happened in other countries and that other representative elements would suffer or be ousted. Prime Minister merely said there was no reason to have such fears. (1)

Actually, the DRV was extremely open on several occasions concerning the dominance of the NLF in a coalition government. On July 25, 1967 Pham Van Dong, in conversations with Marcovich and Aubrac, stated; "Some people think we want to impose socialism on the South. We are convinced that the NLF will not make such an error." (12)

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All indications, throughout the four years of the tracks, were that the DRV was acutely conscious of the need for multi-lateral political participation in the South.

(August 16, 1967 through the Ohio track) At the reception on the day before Algard left, Loan (DRV representative) had said that Hanoi recognized the fact that they had to live for some years to come in a Vietnam which would have two different social and political situations...Loan told Algard he envisages a government with communist participation but which is not communist controlled. (11)

(July 24, 1967 Pham Van Dong) North Vietnam is socialist and wants to remain so. As for the South, our goals are national independence, democracy, peace and neutrality. (9)

The US challenge to the notion of coalition government aside from its fear that the NLF would dominate, was to claim that the NLF was actually a front for the DRV--a position in direct contradiction to the indigenous qualities of the NLF, but extremely saleable at home. According to the Pentagon analyst, "...we knew who their leaders were, including North Vietnamese generals in the South using a variety of names.

The Liberation Front is Hanoi!" (4)

The DRV protected itself from such assaults however on several premises. 1) The DRV conceded that "talks" could open between the US and the DRV, but that South Vietnam would not be a subject of discussion unless representatives from the NLF were present. 2) The DRV acknowledged that the nature of the coalition and the future of reunification were matters to be dealt with by the people in the South.

(March 3, 1968) In so far as it concerned a political solution for South Vietnam, the Foreign Minister repeated the North Vietnamese position that this was a question

which must be discussed with the NLF and that Hanoi cannot speak on behalf of South Vietnam. (25)

(August 16, 1967) The question of unification is postponed to an indefinite point in time in the future. North Vietnam is ready to accept a separate South Vietnamese state which is neutral and based on a coalition government. (38)

North Vietnam could not negotiate on behalf of the South Vietnamese. (38)

(April 8, 1965 Pham Van Dong) The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the NLFSV without any foreign interference. (6)

While the DRV was confident of the ultimate popular support for the NLF and its programme, the United States was less so. In the first place, we tended to conceptualize the existence of South Vietnam as a permanent political entity (in direct violation of the Geneva Accords which we claimed governed our actions in this period). On April 7, 1965, President Johnson said, "...our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack." (5) The analyst notes; "Our preference is clearly for a continued separate existence of South Vietnam." (10) Secretary Rusk, using logic which escapes even the cursory reader, claimed in November of 1966,

...we could not impose a coalition government on the South; we could not turn our men around and start them shooting in the other direction to impose a coalition government. If the South Vietnamese people were to decide on this it was up to them and we would abide by that result, but a coalition would not be imposed by our arms and power. (5)

The only conclusion available from Rusk's thoughts is that

the United States would continue to use its " arms and power" to support a puppet regime in the South which had already declared its refusal to move toward a coalition circumstance. In effect, while we were claiming that we would not oppose a neutral coalition government in South Vietnam, we were doing everything in our power to forstall and co-opt the issue among the Southern population. It is interesting to juxtapose Rusk's negotiating position next to President Johnson's cable to Ambassador Lodge in March of 1964.

It ought to be possible to explain in Saigon that your mission is precisely for the purpose of knocking down the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head, and on this point I think that nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can. (Gravel III, p.511)

It is important to note that while we insisted upon the maintenance of the Government of South Vietnam, we had no intention of jepordizing our interests by involving the GVN in negotiation tracks which they might spoil before we had stabilized the options in our own minds. A State memo of December 3, 1966 reveals that "...on the question of when we bring the GVN into the picture" the answer was, "...some-time we do not contemplate for the present." (10)

While the essence of the United States position was that we must negotiate with the DRV to stop the NLF (and if lucky, negotiate directly with the USSR to call of the DRV to call off the NLF ***) the essence of the DRV position was three fold.

1) Negotiations would have to take place within the context

and goals of the Geneva Accords.

2) Negotiations would not be accompanied by a cease fire, but would take place at the same time as military action continued.

3) Negotiations could only proceed given US commitment to unconditionally stop the bombing of North Vietnam and all other acts of war against the DRV.

*** (11-3-67) "With regard to Vietnam the Secretary (Rusk) saw no need for a conflict of interest between the US and the Soviet Union. It was important that the Soviets recognize that we have a vital interest in what happens in South Vietnam, just as we recognize that the Soviets have an interest as to what happens in North Vietnam. We are prepared to stop the bombing now if the Soviet Union can tell us that the North Vietnamese will stop infiltration." (16)

1) Pham Van Dong detailed the relevance of the Geneva Accords by writing in April 1965,

1. According to the Geneva Accords, the USG must withdraw from South Vietnam US troop, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all US military bases there, and cancel its military alliance with South Vietnam...the USG must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam and completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV. (6)

The second importance of the Geneva agreement is that despite its limited sanction of a demarcation, it is committed in letter as well as principle to the eventual reunification of Vietnam--a principle which the DRV proved very flexible on, but which the US proved uncompromising on.

"We (US) were prepared to accept the Communist world's interest in North Vietnam if they are prepared to accept our interest in the South." (5) The precise commitment to reunification in the Geneva Accords is the foundation of point two and four of the DRV negotiating plank as of April 1965.

2) Pham Van Dong; Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam...the two zones must refrain from entering into any military alliance with foreign countries and there must be no foreign military bases, troops, or military personnel in their respective territory. (6)

4) The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference." (6)

The United States also claimed a commitment to the Geneva Accords, and in the fourteen points which cominated their negotiating plank, exclaimed in January of 1966;

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia.
7. We want no US bases in Southeast Asia.
8. We do not desire to retain US troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured. (12)

Rather than commit ourselves to the letter of Geneva, the US abstractly drew upon what it considered "the spirit of Geneva" to further advocate the independent existence of South Vietnam.

(president Johnson) We believe that the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 could serve as the central elements of a peaceful settlement. These accords provide in essence (?) that both South and North Vietnam should be free from external interference, while at the same time they would be free indeppendently to determine their positions on the question of reunification. (33)

To attempt to reconcile American policy in Indochina with "the essence" of Geneva, or the "spirit" was to transform the "provisional line of demarcation" into a formal political boundary. January 31, 1966, the DRV exposed the fallacy of our position, arguing that "...the US government states that it seeks no military bases in Southeast Asian countries, but on the other hand it has to fulfill its commitments with the SEATO bloc." (13)

2) The position of the DRV toward a cease-fire was two pronged. There was an initial hope that a cease-fire would allow the consolidation of NLF control over all provinces which it dominated at the time of the cease-fire inauguration. The analyst records this fleeting sense of optimism by writing,

If agreed by us (a cease-fire), it would give the NLF unchallenged authority in the areas it now controls.

Such civil administration arrangements as may be made (as in the period following the 1954 Geneva Accords) would allow the NLF to develop local coalition governments. (16)

This hope was immediately undercut by American insistence in September 1965, that "In the event of a cease-fire, it was the US intention to insist on the GVN's right to operate throughout South Vietnam." (11)

Given US refusal to allow NLF consolidation of the South, the DRV's opposition to a cease-fire was very simple. To disarm and demobilize the people in a peoples' war would mean that the people made themselves unnecessarily vulnerable to aggression without the ability to remobilize and re-arm with sufficient speed to avoid disaster. On the other hand, the American Army could evacuate or invade in a matter of days.

(January 31, 1967 through the Romanian track) Certainly at this time armed action in South Vietnam would not cease. It is one thing to mobilize and demobilize a force such as the US has in South Vietnam. US could leave within three days and come back within three days. But if popular forces in South Vietnam demobilized, then remobilization would require much more time. So talks would start with armed action in the South still continuing. (9)

As well, there was a general feeling in the DRV that "We cannot leave our brothers in the South unprotected." (19)

No doubt, Pham Van Dong and General Giap had learned well from the post Geneva betrayal by the US which had resulted in a near elimination of their "demobilized" cadres in the South.

3) The final and most important principle of the DRV negotiating formula was that "talks" could proceed only on the basis of an unconditional US cessation of the bombing against the

North and "all other acts of war against the DRV." July 27, 1967, Pham Van Dong told French interlocutors Aubrac and Marcovich, "We are ready to talk at any time provided that actions against North are unconditionally ended... we are willing to settle for a de facto stoppage." (4)

In August, another succinct statement of the DRV position would come through the Pennsylvania A and M track.

The position of the government of the DRV is that the US should cease definitely and without conditions the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV. (6)

If the USG truly wants to talk, it must, as was made clear in our statement on 28 January 1967, first of all, stop unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV. (18) (December 29, 1967 Trinh)

(Chan February 24, 1968) He (Chan) specified 'all other acts of war' to mean that no airplanes were permitted to fly over the DRV territory and no naval vessels were to have their guns or other weapons directed against DRV territory. (27)

Every track, throughout the four years under discussion, reveals this single pre-occupation of the DRV with securing a cessation to the bombing (despite its inability to stop the military struggle of the people, the social and economic costs of bombing were immense). Though there was some compromise in terms of whether the US would have to publicly announce its unconditional cessation or simply de fact acknowledge it, this demand remained generally consistent throughout the course of the war since 1964..

The United States' response to the DRV was initially that a cessation of the bombing would only be initiated if paralleled by an act of reciprocity by the DRV.

Our position was that we would enter talks without conditions or we would stop the bombing in return for some reciprocal act of military restraint but that we would not stop the bombing simply in exchange for talks. (1)

(June 20, 1967 State to Norway) US view is that cessation of bombing without at least some private assurance of appropriate reciprocal military action by North Vietnam would create situation of major military advantage to North Vietnam and would not be conducive to fruitful talks. (3)

The DRV position was extremely poignant. So far as they were concerned the US bombing was an act of aggression which was illegal and which assailed the sovereignty of the Vietnamese People.

The American bombing of the DRV is illegal. The US should put an end to the bombing and cannot pose conditions. (September 11, 1967) (6)

(April 8, 1968) The unwarranted US bombing of the DRV is an impudent act of aggression. The US must bring it to an end. To ask for 'reciprocity' as a condition, or 'restraint' as a price, is nothing but a trick to blur the distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression. (30)

In September of 1967, President Johnson proposed a softened US line in a speech in San Antonio;

The US Government is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation. (10)

The US rationale was that,

Any cessation of US bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking advantage of the cessation (such as an increase by Hanoi of its infiltration of men and supplies or attacks in the area of the DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's part as to make continued US forbearance impossible. (February 20, 1968) (22)

When the DRV again refused to be pressured into conditions, it released the previously mentioned statement on January

4, 1968 to Stockholm, "We cannot leave our brothers in the South unprotected." (19)

By the end of January, Clark Clifford had clarified the administration position before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Their (DRV) military activity will continue in South Vietnam, I assume, until there is a cease-fire agreed upon. I assume they will continue to transport the normal amount of goods, munitions, men to South Vietnam. I assume we will continue to maintain our forces during that time. (23)

The issue was further complicated in December of 1967 when the US claimed that it would relieve the bombing pressure on the North as a gesture of its willingness to enter talks. The fact was that the air war escalated, and that during the days that Hanoi itself was not bombed, Haiphong and Vinh Linh province were bombed in excess. It became evident to the DRV leadership that the United States was engaging in a carrot and stick strategy (not unlike the approach Nixon has used in mining the harbors and increasing bombing at the same time the baits China and Russia with peace feelers and offers the DRV his "honorable" settlement) whereby its offers to cease the bombing in exchange for talks were paralleled by an actual acceleration of the bombing.

While it can be said that this approach angered the North Vietnamese, it cannot be said that it suprised or intimidated them.

On July 15, 1967, DRV representatives Vy and Oanh

...expressed fear that US will bomb Red River Delta dams during rainy season causing 1 to 1.5 million

dead plus additional 500,000 refugees. Bombing would be blamed on mistake but would really be by design because US has run out of military targets in North Vietnam. (42)

On August 25, 1967, one month after Oanh and Vy expressed their fears, the US released a statement through the Pennsylvania track of Aubrac and Marcovich of which a small and obscure portion read, " The attacks on the dikes were accidental." (15)

In the same talks with Aubrac and Marcovich, DRV representative Mai Van Bo said,

...the Americans are playing a double game--on the one hand they are offering us peace; on the other they increase their bombing. (33)

...now the US tells us that the bombing of Hanoi is suspended without time limit. What has happened is the stopping of bombing of Hanoi but the intensification of bombing elsewhere as in Campha, Haiphong, and Vinh Linh province where the bombing has the character of extermination and systematic destruction. (35)

Still, the Hanoi leadership refused to be coerced by American escalation. Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett released the following article on October 20, 1967 which must have haunted the Washington planners.

The mood of Hanoi is one of toughness and confidence. Although leaders expect Hanoi and Haiphong will probably be destroyed and that the war may last many more years, they feel the worst is behind them, that the daily bombings are absorbed into the country's organism. (54)

The following comment came through the Romanian channel October 25, 1967.

They (DRV) had reviewed capacity of North Vietnamese resistance in case war goes on. From all points of view, military, economic, political, and social, 'I can tell you North Vietnam can carry on long-term struggle. (10)

Perhaps the most immoral and even illogical episode which the US used to apologize for its continuation of the bombing was that in order to protect the secrecy of the initial talks the US felt compelled to continue to bomb so as not to alert the press that anything was up.

(September 23, 1967) American military actions during the last month reflect in part extreme secrecy with which Washington has handled this exchange. The USG has considered it unwise to change decisions made prior to the report of M and A's trip to Hanoi, except in regard to the bombing of Hanoi itself, because it wanted to keep the circle of awareness of this exchange as small as possible to avoid premature public debate. (37)

Not only did the US succeed in further driving a wedge between itself and the DRV with this carrot and stick approach, it managed to forclose the Kissinger/Aubrac/Marcovich track which to date had been the most productive. In October 1967, Mai Van Bo explained,

Actually, the US has been following a policy of escalation of an extremely serious nature. In these conditions, the US proposals of peace are double faced. At a time when the US is pursuing a policy of escalation we cannot receive Kissinger nor comment on the American proposals transmitted through this channel. (50)

Given the eventual agreement to unconditionnally cease the bombing of the North, the final and essential premise of the Vietnamese peace proposal was the total withdrawal of US troops.

The DRV has always given the principle of US withdrawal top billing. Pham Van Dong directly told us that the end of the war means 'a withdrawal of US forces'. In the four points, for example, Hanoi states; 'The USG must withdraw from South Vietnam US troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all US military bases there, and cancel its military alliance with South Vietnam. (1)

On several occasions the US declared its willingness to withdraw, and to disavow any desire for bases in Southeast Asia,

but always withdrawal followed conditions, and always it backed the DRV unduely into the position of aggressor against whom the US had been legitimately compelled to challenge and intervene.

In the Manila Declaration (10-25-65) we stated that allied forces 'shall be withdrawn after close consultation, if the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. (1)

Even given the DRV overall commitment to expell US forces, there was a persistent pragmatism at work among the northern leadership, a persistent confidence of ultimate victory which led to an unquestionable patience.

It is repeated at every level that total independence with complete American withdrawal from South Vietnam is the unalterable aim of the Hanoi government and the NLFV. They are prepared to fight ten or twenty years to achieve this, and life is being reorganized on this basis. (54)

This patient confidence would reveal itself in Pham Van Dong's statement received through the Pennsylvania track in July 25, 1967/

'Some US troops would have to stay (in SVN) until the end of political settlement.' This probably means that the US forces would be allowed to linger on as long as they did not interfere with the process of political settlement. (3)

The final revelation, one which seems to have taken Ho and Pham Van Dong by surprise as well as Western diplomats was expressed during the June 1964 Seaborne Mission to Hanoi.

...our people are determined to struggle. It is impossible, quite impossible (excuse me for saying this) for you Westerners to understand the forces of the peoples' will to resist and to continue. The struggle of the people exceeds the imagination. It has astonished us too. (3)

VIC1: The Ronning Track

Possible 'national defense' items from the transparencies.

- (149) 1 Ronning critical of US policy on China, Vietnam.
Canada's 'ulterior motive'.
Chinese policy: 'the war be fought until the US was defeated'.
DRV expect destruction of Hanoi/Haiphong.
- 2 US tells Ronning the importance of secrecy.
Canada's 'veiled form of pressure'.
- 4 US intentions about the POL; escalations.
DRV stress importance of secrecy; ref LaPira leak.
- 5 leaks; Raffaelli/Eastern European embassy; DRV motives.
ref POWs.
- (157) 3 Canada's 'ulterior motives'; China, especially with respect to UN, Canadian recognition.
Ronning as critical of US Far Eastern policies.
'...if anything went wrong,' disavow involvement.
- 4 Domestic situation in Canada on Vietnam policy.
"Ploy with Hanoi for obtaining visa"
- 5 Ronning critical of US policy on China, especially UN, and 'our private misgivings'.
Ronning and China with respect to the UN.
- 8 Canadians divided about the Ronning mission.
Ronning favors China recognition, UN membership.
'do nothing to undermine the publicly stated positions of the United States'.
Rusk: "I attach no importance to his trip and expect nothing out of it".
What not to tell GVN.
- (163) 9 Lodge: "...the Geneva accords which have now been so thoroughly violated."
DRV expectations about the war.
- (178) 24 Rusk: fear of the international reaction to a leak about US sabotage of the Ronning mission.
DRV on the necessity to denounce the LaPira contact after a leak.
Moore on the danger of leaks.
- 25 More Moore on the danger of leaks. (Hanoi had complied with secrecy so far.)
ref public statement about the trip; how to deceive the public.
- (181) 27 DRV desire for secrecy.
China's relationship to the Ronning mission and leak;
Ho's trip to Peking; speculations.

- (187) 33 DRV expectations- US to bomb Hanoi/Haiphong;
DRV preparations.
DRV on whether Ho was in China.
Relationship of the DRV to Soviets and Chinese.
- (190) 36 Bundy: Hanoi's state of mind; effects of bombing.
Chinese 'sensitive to any threat to their own territory...'
DRV/Chinese relationship.

VIC1: The Ronning Track

Possible government themes; the 'national defense' items sorted.

I US-Allied Relations

Pages

A) GVN

-What not to tell the GVN. 8

B) CANADA

-Canadian attitude: 'ulterior motive', 'veiled form of pressure', 'our private misgivings'. 1-3, 5(159)

-Ronning critical of US policy on China in UN. 1, 3

-Canadian domestic politics with respect to Vietnam. 4

-Canadians divided about Ronning mission. 8

C) CHINA

-Ronning critical of US China policy, esp. on UN. 1, 3

-Chinese policy on Vietnam: war until US defeated. 1

-China recognition, UN. 3, 5, 8

-Ronning on China recognition, UN. 8, 5(159)

-Ho trip to Peking. 27, 33

-China relationship to Ronning mission and leak. 27

-DRV and the China/Soviet relationship. 33, 36

-Chinese 'sensitive to any threat to their own territory'.

II DRV: Assessment, Intelligence

-DRV expects Hanoi/Haiphong destruction; preparation. 1, 9, 33

-US POL intentions; escalations. 4

- 'Ploy with Hanoi for obtaining visa'. 4
- 'do nothing to undermine the publically stated
positions of the United States'. 8
- Ho trip to Peking. 27, 33
- DRV and China/Soviet relations. 33, 36
- Bundy: Hanoi state of mind; effects of bombing. 36

III Secrecy

A) US

- US tell Ronning of import of secrecy. 2
- Rusk: fears international reaction the leaks about
US sabotage of Ronning mission. 24
- public statement about the trip; how to deceive
the public. 25

B) CANADA

- 'if anything went wrong'; disavow involvement 3
- leaks: Moore on the danger of leaks.

C) DRV

- Secrecy: DRV stress. 4, 25, 27
- Leaks: LaPira 4, 24
- Leaks: Raffaelli/Eastern European; DRV motives. 5(153)
- China relationship to Ronning mission and leak. 27

IV POWs

- POWs 5(153)

V Other Interesting or Useful Themes

- 'if anything went wrong', disavow involvement. 3
- 'do nothing to undermine the publically stated 8
positions of the United States'.
- Rusk: 'I attach no importance to his trip and expect 8
nothing out of it'.
- Lodge: '...the Geneva accords which have now been so 9
thoroughly violated.'
- Rusk: fear international reaction to leak about US 24
sabotage of the Ronning mission.
- Public statement about the trip; how to deceive 25
public.

VIC1: The Mayflower Track

Possible 'national defense' items from the transparencies

- (45) 108 Taylor assessment of DRV strategy; predictions 4 May 65.
Board of National Estimates "highly sensitive, limited
distribution" memo on likely Communist reactions
to US moves. (22Ap65)
Ref McCone memo (\$IXE) (28Ap65)
- 109 Raborn's comments on McCone memo: assessment of DRV
strengths and attitudes. (6My65)
McCone supp an action against the North.
Ref USIB judgement on US punishment of the DRV. (18F65)
Bombing strategy assessment and negotiations.
USSR, CPR, DRV differences.
Soviet pressures on DRV.
- 110 TROJAN HORSE photo mission.
SA-2 SAM site spotted.
Other Soviet aid.
"more direct confrontation of US and USSR military force."
-Soviet "flashpoint".
LBJ 'personal FLAH message' to Taylor.
RT can be completed by Wednesday.
Call pause 'privately to the attention of Moscow and Hanoi'.
"report publically after the pause"
Embarrassment of Quat with respect to Buddha's birthday.
- (53) 116 "US will not get tired or be affected by very small
domestic opposition or international pressures".
LBJ speech- no references to the pause.
Chinese expansionist aims.
Foy Kohler message transmission attempt.
- 117 "important, high-level private message"
More on Kohler attempt.
- 118 More on Kohler attempt.
- 119 More on Kohler attempt.
- 120 Kornieko: "that the US has channels."
"Rather strenuous nature of the [US] document".
"flimsy rationale for Soviet refusal"
Chicom charges of collusion against Soviets.
Kohler on Soviet attitude. ["Commie world"]
- 121 Kohler: "we are simply inviting rebuff"
Text of US ultimatum.
Reference to Seaborn-Czech conversation.
- (60) 123 Salinger approach. (11 May 65)
Salinger terms.
Salinger approach. (13 May 65)
- 124 Soviet reciprocity on US forbearance.
Soviets to disavow Salinger if leak.

VIC1: The Mayflower Track

Possible government themes: the 'national defense' items sorted.

I US Internal Decisionmaking	Pages
-Reference to McCone memo (§IXE)-28Ap65	108
-McCone support air action against the North; bombing strategy assessment and negos.	109
-"US will not get tired or be affected by very small domestic opposition or international pressures."	116
-Kohler: "rather strenuous nature of the [US] document"; "we are simply inviting rebuff"	120-121
II US-Allied Relations	
A) GVN	
-embarrassment of Quat With respect to Buddha's birthday.	110
B) CANADA	
-reference to Seaborn-Czech conversation.	121
C) CZECHOSLOVAKIA	
-reference to Seaborn-Czech conversation.	121
D) SOVIET UNION	
-Soviet, CPR, DRV differences.	109
-Soviet pressures on DRV.	109
-SA-2 SAM sites spotted; other Soviet aid.	110

- "more direct confrontation of US and USSR military force"- Soviet "flashpoint"	110
- call pause "privately to the attention of Moscow and Hanoi"	110
- Foy Kohler message transmission attempt.	116-120
- "that the USG has channels": Kornieko.	120
- "flimsy rationale for Soviet refusal."	120
- CPR charges of collusion against Soviets.	120
- Kohler on Soviet attitude. ["Commie world"]	120
- Salinger approach 11, 13 May 65.	123
- Salinger terms.	123
- Soviet reciprocity on US forbearance.	124
- Soviets to disavow Salinger if leak.	124

E) CHINA

- Board of National Estimates: "Highly sensitive, limited distribution" memo on likely Communist reactions to US moves. (22 Apr 65)	108
- USSR, CPR, DRV differences.	109
- Communist China expansionist aims.	116
- Chicom charges of collusion against the Soviets	120

III DRV: Assessment, Intelligence.

A) ASSESSMENT

- Taylor assessment of DRV strategy; predictions	108
- Board of National Estimates' "Highly sensitive, limited distribution" memo on likely Communist reactions to US moves. 22 Apr 65	108
- Ref to McCone memo (\$IXE). (28 Apr 65)	108

-Raborn's comments on McCone memo: assessment of DRV strengths and attitudes.	109
-Ref to USIB judgement on US punishment of DRV.	109
-Bombing strategy assessment and negotiations.	109
-USSR, CPR, DRV differences.	109
-Soviet pressures on DRV.	109
-TROJAN HORSE photo mission; SA-2 SAM site spotted; other Soviet aid.	110
-Call pause "privately to the attention of Moscow and Hanoi".	110
-Foy Kohler ms. transmission attempt.	116-121

B) INTELLIGENCE

-TROJAN HORSE photo mission; SA-2 SAM site spotted.	110
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IV Secrecy

-Board of National Estimates "highly sensitive, limited distribution" memo on likely Communist reactions to US moves.	108
-LBJ "personal FLASH ms." to Taylor.	
-Call pause "privately to the attention of Moscow and Hanoi".	110
-"report publically after the pause".	110
-LBJ speech- no reference to the pause.	116
-Foy Kohler ms. transmission attempt.	116-121
-"that the US has channels": Kornieko.	120
-Soviets to disavow Salinger if leak.	124

V Military Information

- RT can be completed by Wednesday. 110

VI Sources of Positive Themes

- RT can be completed by Wednesday. 110
- "report publically after the pause". 110
- "US will not get tired or be affected by very small domestic opposition or international pressures" 116
- "rather strenuous nature of the [US] document"; 120-121
"we are simply inviting rebuff"-Kohler.
- text of US ultimatum. 121

VIC1: The XYZ Track

Possible 'national defense' items from the transparencies.

- (70) 2 -Bo message to US by France "in strict confidence".
-Duntov saw Bo "Against State Department wishes."
- (78) 10 -Good references to bombings in the North.
-DRV wrt USSR, China.
-DRV: assessment.
- (82) 2 -Manac'h refuses to give Bo the name of his US contact.
-The political risks of communicating with the US.
-DRV negotiation stance.
- 3 -Suggestion that Bo statements conflict with those of the NLF.
-DRV negotiations stance, continued.
-SVN military leaders, as "traitors".
-Reproof of US for the bombings.
- 4 -GAP
-Duntov/Maissi: conflicting stories of 2d Duntov/Bo meeting.
- 5 -Bo: UN, without China, is not acceptable.
-LBJ press conference.
- 6 -LBJ press conference, cont.
- 7 -LBJ press conference, cont.
-Gullion "authorized, but downable."
-talking points: on increased China involvement in NVN.
-talking points: threaten "wider war".

VIC1: The XYZ Track

Possible government themes; the 'national defense' items sorted.

I US Internal Decisionmaking.	Pages
-Duntov saw Bo "Against State Department wishes".	2 (70)
-Gullion "authorized, but diownable."	7
II US-Allied Relations	
A) GVN	
-SVN miliatry leaders, as "traitors".	3
B) FRANCE	
-Bo message to US by France "in strict confidence"	2 (70)
-Manac'h refuses to give Bo name of US contact.	2 (82)
-Duntov/Maissi: conflicting stories of 2d Duntov-Bo meeting.	4
C) SOVIET UNION	
-DRV with respect to USSR, China.	10
D) CHINA	
-DRV with respect to USSR, China.	10
-Bo: UN, without China, not acceptable.	5
-Talking points: on increased Chinese involvement in NVN.	7
E) UN	
-Bo: UN, without China, is not acceptable.	5
III DRV: Assessments, Intelligence.	
-DRV: with respect to USSR, China.	10
-DRV: strategy assessment.	10
-Suggest Bo statements conflict with those of the NLF.	3
-Talking points: on increased Chinese involvement in NVN.	7

IV Secrecy

- Bo message to US by France "in strict confidence". 2 (70)
- Manac'h refuses to give Bo the name of the US contact. 2 (82)
- The political risks of communicating with US. 2 (82)
- DRV negotiating stance. 2-3 (82-83)
- Gullion "authorized, but disownable". 7

V

- LBJ press conference. 5-7

VI Sources for Positive themes

- Good references to US bombings. 10, 3
- GAP. 4
- Talking points: threaten "wider war". 7

VIC1: The Pinta/Rangoon Track

Possible "national defense" items from the transparencies.

- (119) 2 -Byroade, DRV: assert need for secrecy.
-Byroade meeting with UThiHan, USoeTin.
-"experience with FE Communists only of the Chinese variety..."
- (123) 6 -Assessment of DRV communications; involvement of Chinese facilities.
-Byroade: "we are still in clear as far as secrecy of Rangoon operation is concerned."
7 -"story was being circulated here" [of P/R]; French involvement in leak; threat to channel.
-Intelligence on NLF activity, truck movements.
- 8 -GAP
-Byroade: aidememoire "which I had said I would keep confidential"
-Vu calls US aide memoire an "ultimatum".
-DRV "had issued pulbic statements which indicated its position".
-White House leak; Vu reprimand; Byroade confirmed.
- 22 -DRV communications; cryptography; NSA readings.
- 30 -Vu: on US domestic opposition.
-Vu discontinues contacts on basis US bomb resumption.

VIC1: The Pinta/Rangoon Track

Possible government themes; the 'national defense' items sorted.

I US-Allied Relations

A) BURMA

-Byroade meeting with UThiHan, USoeTim. 2

B) CHINA

-"experience with FE Communists only of the Chinese variety.." 2

-assessment of DRV communications; involvement of Chinese facilities. 6

II DRV: Assessment, Intelligence

-Byroade, DRV: assert need for secrecy. 2

-Assessment of DRV communications; involvement of Chinese facilities. 6

-Intelligence on NLF activity, truck movements. 7

-DRV communications; cryptography; NSA readings. 22

III Secrecy

-Byroade, DRV: assert need for secrecy. 2

-Byroade: "we are still in clear as far as secrecy of Rangoon operation is concerned." 6

-"story was being circulated here" [of P/R]. French involvement in leak; threat to channel. 7

-Byroade: aide memoire "which I had said I would keep confidential". 8

-White House leak; Vu reprimand; Byroade confirmed. 8

IV Sources for Positive Themes

-GAP	8
-Vu calls US aide memoire an "ultimatum".	8
-DRV "had issued public statements which indicated its position".	8
-Vu on US domestic opposition.	30
-Vu discontinues contacts on basis US bomb resumption.	30

VIC2: The Marigold Track

Possible 'national defense' items from the transparencies.

Page

- (5) 1 Soviet role in Lewandowski initiative.
Poles' intentionally 'ambiguous statements; role.
Secrecy: Poles' pressure on US with respect to leaks.
- 2 Leaks: how the Poles could use leaks.
Poles policy guidance from the DRV.
Assessment of Rapacki; Lewandowski role.
- 3 The Poles one major 'blunder'.
- (9) 5 Poles role in causing contact to abort.
- (15) 11 Soviet role; interests; with respect to Poles.
Lewandowski: Hanoi "tightly controlled" by Chinese.
- (17) 13 Lewandowski: China as communist hardliner.
Leaks and Pressures: lots.
- 14 GVN: 'less detailed' report on Marigold given to GVN.
Leaks and Pressures, cont.
ref. 'constraints imposed by DRV relations with China'.
- (20) 16 refs to specific bombing missions- military information:
RT 52, especially.
Bombing of Chinese, Rumanian Embassies.
Poles attitude on bombings.
- 18 Lewandowski stresses secrecy.
Poles 'stretched our meaning'.

Gronouski: frank comments on US sincerity.

- (43) 20 Lewandowski: possible US-Chinese collusion? especially, on Soviet overflights?

Lewandowski raises possibility of ousting Ky.

- 21 Lewandowski: Poles out if "Americans are trying to feel out the Chinese"

China/Russia strains. Soviet overflights prohibited.

Lewandowski: "Ky could be ousted." D'Orlandi: "...take car of itself" with the constitution.

D'Orlandi: Lewandowski reflects Pham Van Dong and Giap.

- (48) 25 RT 52: targets listed.
26 RT 52 execute message with targets.
27 RT 52 amendment.

On Lewandowski's to DRV; role.

- (99) 76 Bombing targets; military and accidents.
Terrorism reciprocity request.

"Soviet awareness of Marigold": Zinchuk.

- (101) 78 Terrorism decline "a quiet way" to reciprocate.
Soviet knowledge of Marigold.

DRV sensitivity on bombings.

Role of US military in decisionmaking.

- 79 Soviet view of US bombing patterns.

Wm.Bundy: importance of secrecy.

- 80 Soviet (Bucharest) obligations towards DRV.

Report of North Korean pilots; Cubans.

Terrorism reciprocity request.

81 Terrorism reciprocity request dropped.
Nautical/statute dispute: 'niggling and haggling'.
82 '...military briefers are not aware of Marigold'.
US stress secrecy with respect to the Pope and Poles.
83 Poles leak to the Pope.
Polish Ambassador statement; our informing Poles of
24 Dec 66 move.

(108) 85 Dobrynin to Thompson: 'completely off the record'.
Soviet attitudes towards US moves-'baffled'.
86 US military role in decisionmaking.
Porter insults Poles.
Favor Canadians as channel.
Goldberg to UThant: US view of Marigold.
87 NLF/DRV split suggested.
89 Gronouski suggest Soviets as intermediaries.
Gronouski against Canada; reasons.
Goldberg tells UThant, Ignatieff about Marigold.
Report on NLF-Saigon incidents.
(116) 93 DRV's efforts to build world opinion against US.
Rusk: 'strictest security'.
94 On the leadership of the DRV: not monolithic.
Polish agreement 'delicate matter in Hanoi'.
Assessment of bargaining positions.
95 Michalowski: more assessment of Marigold;
but 'this is past history, I guess.'

DRV decision 'hotly contested' in Praesidium.

Gronouski negotiations suggestion.

(122) 99 Sainteny suggested for negotiations.

Thompson to make contact in Soviet Union.

Brown's forgiveness.

(125) 102 Saigon incident report.

(128) 105 Joseph Fried leak.

Saigon incident report.

(137) 114 Saigon incidents reports.

Ky stress secrecy; Lodge concurs with explanation.

(144) 121 Estabrook leak; Martin/UTHant implicated.

On the further use of 'Bloc' countries.

Saigon incidents reports.

122 Saigon incidents reports (cont.).

(151) 128 "Rapacki's continuing vindictiveness".

Defense of Lodge on the 10 points.

129 "Rapacki haggled".

133 Rusk on 'White Book' leak.

Michalowski ref to Hightower leak; Poles

VIC2: The Marigold Track

Possible government themes; the 'national defense' items sorted.

	Pages
I Internal US Decisionmaking	
-Assessment of bargaining positions.	94
-Gronouski: frank comments on US sincerity; suggestions about negotiations.	18, 95
-Bombing targets: military and accidents.	76
-Role of the US military in decisionmaking.	78, 86
-'Military briefers are not aware of Marigold'.	82
II US-Allied Relations	
A) GVN	
-'less detailed' report on Marigold given to GVN.	14
-US informs GVN, Poles of bombing decisions.	17
-Lewandowski: 'Ky could be ousted.' D'Orlandi: 'take care of itself'.	20-21
-Ky stress secrecy; Lodge concurs with explanation.	114
B) CANADA	
-Favor Canadians as a channel.	86
-Gronouski's reasons against Canada.	89
-Goldberg tells UThant, Ignatieff about Marigold.	89
-Estabrook leak; Martin/UThant implicated.	121
C) UK	
-Brown's forgiveness	99

D) FRANCE

-Sainteny suggested for negotiations. 99

E) ITALY

-Lewandowski: 'Ky could be ousted.' D'Orlandi: 21

'take care of itself.'

-Poles leak to Pope; US stress secrecy. 82-83

F) SOVIET UNION

-Soviet role in Polish initiative; interests. 1, 11

-Lewandowski: possible US-Chinese collusion? 20-21

(Soviet overflights prohibited.)

-Soviet knowledge of Marigold; Zinchuk. 76, 78

-Soviet view of US bombing patterns. 79

-Soviet attitudes towards US moves-'baffled'. 85

-Soviet (Bucharest) obligations towards DRV. 80

-Dobrynin to Thompson: 'completely off the record'. 85

-Gronouski suggests Soviets as intermediaries. 89

-Thompson to make contact in Soviet Union. 99

-On the further use of "Bloc" countries. 121

G) POLAND

-Soviet role in Lewandowski initiative. 1, 11

-Poles intentionally 'ambiguous' statements; role 1, 5
in abortion of track.

-Poles policy guidance from the DRV; role. 2, 27

-Assessment of Rapacki, Lewandowski role in contacts. 2

-The Poles' one major blunder.	3
- <u>Leaks and Pressures</u> ; Poles' pressure on the US with respect to leaks.	1-2, 13-14
-Poles attitudes towards the bombings.	16
-Poles 'stretched our meaning'.	18
-Lewandowski: 'Ky could be ousted'.	20-21
-D'Orlandi: Lewandowski reflects PVD and Giap.	21
-Nautical/statute dispute: "niggling and haggling".	81
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- (24) 17 Kosygin's interpreter to Thompson: 'quite a switch'.
"Change of tenses" as potential "public propaganda" tool.

- 18 Soviets "subject to public exposure".

Kosygin "confidential communication" with DRV.

"Materials relating to Kosygin's stay".

Telephone intercept; "content".

Need for 'confidential declaration'.

- 19 Kosygin willing to "subordinate DRV interests," "Soviet pressures" on DRV.

"faintly sketched in the materials at hand"

Q Rapacki on Sov/DRV.

Kosygin assess US position; "his personal embarrassment."

- 20 Soviet loss of "credit in Hanoi".

Zinchuk's "self-serving" remarks.

"Kosygin-Breshnev telephone conversation"

Soviets as ultimatum messengers to DRV.

- 21 Kosygin on Chinese in and with respect to DRV.

22 Soviets on China: 'obsessed'.

"Fury" in China; antagonistic towards negotiations.

Chinese expansionist aims.

Soviets fear US/Chinese collusion.

(35) 3 PVD to Salisbury: "...there are many things I can't tell you."

DRV want "clandestine" discussion.

4 DRV (&US) want "clandestine" discussions; "secure"

"Hanoi's concern for the Chinese Communists"

5 Salisbury security measures on report to US.

(39) 7 LeChang to Guthrie: desire for confidentiality.

(50) 18 Bundy: "secrecy... necessary for the success of at least
the early stages of negotiation."

Bundy: tell Ky and Do of the need for secrecy.

Guthrie instructions: US has kept secret; complain of DRV
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(58) 26 Estabrook leak: what to tell LeChang.

On secrecy of Moscow contacts; US, DRV desire.

POWs.

27 Kosygin's obsession with China; all sorts.

Wilson thought Kosygin "lukewarm" on PVD.

28 DRV forces north of DMZ.

US troop and ship movements.

Cooper suggest "technical check on Kosygin's contact."

Kosygin said US 'in contact' with Hanoi.

(70) 38 Kosygin on Chinese participation in a Geneva.
Laos.

Kosygin: "there are Chinese troops in NVN"; Chinese faction
in Hanoi.

"British would try to 'deliver the Americans'"

(72) 40 DOD: DRV resupply traffic reports; "hazard to our forces"/
Intelligence on DRV forces; intentions.
On making intelligence reports public.

41 What to tell UK about TET.

(80) 48 Lodge: "these moves will come to nothing"; assessment of DRV.
Ky's opinions on "public opinion".

49 Wilson-Kosygin "jocular exchange".

(84) 52 DRV forces north of the DMZ.

Informing Ky of bomb refrain; whether 'notification' is
desirable.

Canberra, Wellington, Seoul, Manila may "arrange unobtrusive
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(91) 59 (E) "Any secret assurances" to (C) "Any assurances".
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(93) 61 Press speculation on 'continued suspension'.
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- (94) 62 Telephone intercept.
NSA reports Hanoi-Moscow message.
- 63 Lodge: on press speculation; Lodge and COMUSMACV mum.
Lodge: Our recce, intelligence capabilities on d infiltration detection.
- 64 Bundy: harm to Soviet role from exposure of discussions;
concern about UK leaks.
ref Palliser.
- 65 DRV DMZ buildup; danger to US forces.
Soviet concern pro-Chinese "hawks" in Hanoi.
refs Palliser.
- 66 "For disclosure to Ky at your discretion and timing.
- 67 Signals: d infiltration or d assassination, torture etc.
- (110) 78 Kosygin support VN proposal publically.
Kosygin compare US, DRV resupply efforts.
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"Soviets not confident US proposal had been very serious".
"While it is perhaps inadvisable to rake up history."
- 79 Kosygin: Chinese seek inc tension; US-Soviet confrontation.
- 80 Kosygin: "Chinese want to heat up situation", expansionists:
their menu enumerated.
ref "Nixons and Goldwaters".
Kosygin fear US-Chinese collusion.
- 81 Thompson's views of potential Soviet reaction to Haiphong mining.
Kosygin's fear US-Chinese (covert) collusion; DRV-Chinese alliance.

(122) 90 Poles to give UK version of "December affairs".

Rapacki warn Chinese would not permit DRV collapse;

nor Soviets, Chinese.

Kuznetsov ref US-Chinese secret talks.

(130) 98 US-DRV "confidential discussion": could Gromyko play a role?

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--END--

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- Ky's opinion on "public opinion". 48
- Informing Ky of bomb restraint. 52
- "For disclosure to Ky at your discretion and timing" 66

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- UK role- "sometimes embarrassing to the US, which greatly preferred confidential dealings..." 14
- Wilson leaks; adverse consequences. 14
- Bundy: harm to Soviet role from exposure of discussion; concern about UK leaks. 64
- Wilson thought Kosygin "lukewarm" on PVD. 27
- "British would try to deliver the Americans". 38
- Wilson-Kosygin "jocular exchange". 49
- Bruce, Cooper "stormy session" with Wilson, Brown; personal conflicts. 14, 53
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-Soviets as ultimatum messengers to the DRV.	20
-Kosygin on Chinese in and with respect to the DRV.	21
-Kosygin's 'obsession' with China; all sorts.	22, 27
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-Kuznetsov ref US-China secret talks.	90
-Wilson thought Kosygin 'lukewarm' on PVD.	27
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- Thompson's views of potential Soviet reaction to Haiphong mining. 81
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D) POLAND

- Q Rapacki on Soviet/DRV. 19
- Rapacki warn Chinese would not permit the DRV to collapse; nor Soviets, the Chinese. 90
- Poles to give UK version of "December affair". 90

E) LAOS

- Message to Saigon, Bangkok & Vientiane on bomb refraint; whether 'notification' is desirable. 53

F) THAILAND

- Message to Saigon, Bangkok and Vietniane on bomb refraint; whether "notification" is desirable. 53
- Kosygin: "Chinese want to heat up situation", expansionists: their menu enumerated. 80

G) INDIA, PAKISTAN

- Kosygin: "Chinese want to heat up situation", expansionists: their menu enumerated. 80

H) PHILIPPINES

- Kosygin: "Chinese want to heat up situation," 80
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- Canberra, Wellington, Seoul, Manila may "arrange 53
unobtrusive contacts."

I) AUSTRALIA, NZ, SOUTH KOREA

- Canberra, Wellington, Seoul, Manila may "arrange 53
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J) CHINA

- Kosygin on Chinese in and with respect to DRV. 21
- "fury" in China' antagonistic towards negotiations. 22
- Soviets fear US/Chinese (covert) collusion; 22, 80-81
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- "Hanoi's concern for the Chinese Communists". 4
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- Kosygin: "Chinese want to heat up situation," 22, 80
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- Rapacki warn Chinese would not permit DRV collapse; 90
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II DRV: Assessment, Intelligence.

-Kosygin "confidential communication" with DRV.	18
-Kosygin willing to "subordinate DRV interests,"	19
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-Q Rapacki on Soviet/ DRV.	19
-Soviet loss of "credit in Hanoi".	20
-Soviets as ultimatum messengers to DRV.	20
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-Wilson thought Kosygin "lukewarm" on PVD.	27
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-DOD: DRV resupply traffice reports:	40
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-Intelligence on DRV forces; intentions.	40
-On making intelligence reports public.	40
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-Kosygin compare US, DRV resupply efforts.	78
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-Rapacki warn Chinese would not permit DRV collapse;	90
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-Reports on Soviet, Chinese-DRV arms supply.	98

III Secrecy

- UK role-"sometimes embarrassing to the US, 14
which greatly preferred confidential dealings..."
- Wilson leaks; adverse consequences. 14
- "change of tenses" as potential "public 17
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- Soviets "subject to public exposure." 18
- Kosygin "confidential communication" with DRV; 18
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- PVD to Salisbury: "...there are many things I 3
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- DRV (&US) want "clandestine" discussion, "secure". 3, 4
- Salisbury security measures on report to US. 5
- LeChang to Guthrie: desire for confidentiality. 7
- Bundy: "secrecy...necessary for the success of at 18
least the early stages of negotiation."
- Bundy: tell Ky and Do of the need for secrecy. 18
- Guthrie instructions: US has kept secret; 18
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secrecy.
- Estabrook leak: what to tell LeChang. 26
- On the secrecy of Moscow contacts; US, DRV desire. 26
- On making intelligence reports public. 40
- What to tell UK about TET. 41
- Ky's opinions on "public opinion". 48
- Informing Ky of bomb refraint. 52
- "For disclosure to Ky at your discretion and timing" 66

- Message to Saigon, Bangkok, and & Vietianeon 53
on bomb refraint; whether 'notification' is desirable.
- Canberra, Wellington, Seoul, Manila may "arrange
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- UK: why not informed on tense change? 53
- Secret if DRV so wishes. 59
- On publicity around deescalation=need for. 59
- Press speculation on "continued suspension". 61
- Lodge: on press speculation; Lodge and COMUSMACV mum. 63
- Bundy: harm to Soviet role from exposure of 64
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- Kosygin support VN proposal publically. 78
- Poles to give UK version of "December affair". 90
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- US want an "assurance-not necessarily--" 98
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- telephone intercepts;"content";"faintly sketched 18, 62
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-Lodge: "these moves will come to nothing"; assessment of DRV.	48
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-On publicity around deescalation; the need for it.	59
-Lodge: our reconnaissance, intelligence capabilities on detection of infiltration rate.	63
-Kosygin support Vietnam proposal publically.	78
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-"Nixon's and Goldwaters".	80

VIC4: The Ohio Track (and Setting and Miscellaneous)

Possible 'national defense' items from the transparencies.

Setting:

- (6) 3 -Rumanians admit only interest is bombstop; "very poor reporters."
- "Hanoi did not take the Rumanians seriously"
- Swedish role "dominated by their domestic politics: there were frequent press leaks on GOS-DRV contacts:"
- "The US...never put much stock in the Swedish messages,"
- 4 -Hanoi "not comfortable with" Norway's neutralism.
- "Norwegian domestic politics" were "vehemently anti-American" but
"Norwegians did not press us hard on the bombing issue."
- Marcovich, Aubrac "committed to getting the US to stop the bombing".
- d'Orlandi's "very special view": settlement first.
- 5 -NORTH VIETNAMESE STRATEGY: decisive/final victory;
talks/negotiations/settlement.

Miscellaneous:

- (78) 23 -Lodge saw two difficulties with the 10 points.
-Lew: "(1) there was a danger of a leak and that secrecy was essential for Hanoi;"
-Lew: "(2) that delays would give those 'working against a solution' time to 'put down the clamps on talks'".
- (85) 30 -Goldberg speech: Howard (10F67): "exceedingly difficult to negotiate in a goldfish bowl;" "we give our assurance that the secrecy and security of such private explorations would be safeguarded on our side."
-Goldber: "we do not and should not ask that freedom of expression be curtailed..."

Ohio:

- (102) 1 -Algard concern for US POWs.
-DRV: Chinese "speeches from other quarters" with erroneous preconditions.
- (106) 5 -on Algard raising the US POW issue again.
-"on conditions of NVN calling for Chinese help".
-Loan: previous US escalations against negotiations.
- (114) 13 -NLF representative in Peking had 'very few contacts' with the
VN Embassy.
-Concern about Algard misconstruing US as bombing insurance.
-"Cooper's suggestions on rejecting the Marigold 10 points".
-Marigold, "pursuit of Ohio could be embarrassing to Algard and ourselves."
- 14 -"this among other factors prevents us from describing to GON what
exactly is being discussed."
-Oslo-Peking communications problems: "not adequate for rapidity
or security."
- (118) 17 -Ngo: "frequent peace feelers from the American side via American
'satellite countries'".
-Ngo: Norway 'not neutral', 'indirectly involved.'
-Ngo: Peking 'insecure'.
- 18 -US remarks on Norwegina politics: 'pigheadedness.'
-Ngo on US escalation and negotiations.
- 19 -Ngo "wished that our contacts continue, in a discreet manner,"

VIC4: The Ohio Track (and Setting and Miscellaneous)

Possible government themes; the 'national defense' items sorted.

I US-Allied Relations

Pages

A) FRANCE

-Marcovich, Aubrac "committed to getting the US to stop the bombing". 4 (7)

B) ITALY

-d'Orlandi's 'very special view': settlement first. 4 (7)

C) NORWAY

-Hanoi "not comfortable": Norway 'not neutral', 'indirectly involved.' 4, 17 (7, 118)

-"Norwegian domestic politics" were "vehemently anti-American", 4 (7)
but "Norwegians did not press us hard on the bombing issue."

-Algard concern for US POWs; US on Algard raising issue. 1, 5 (102, 106)

-Concern about Algard misconstruing US as bombing insurance. 13 (114)

-Marigold, "pursuit of Ohio could be embarrassing to Algard and ourselves." 13 (114)

-"this among other factors prevents us from describing to GON what exactly is being discussed." 14 (115)

-Oslo-Peking communications problems: "not adequate for rapidity or security". 14 (115)

-US remarks on Norwegian politics: 'pigheadedness'. 18 (118)

D) SWEDEN

- Swedish role "dominated by their domestic politics: there were 3 (6)
frequent press leaks on GOS-DRV contacts:"
- "The US...never put much stock in the Swedish messages". 3 (6)

E) ROMANIA

- Romanians admit only interest is bombstop; "very poor 3 (6)
reporters."

F) POLAND

- Lew: "(1) there was a danger of a leak and that secrecy was 23 (78)
essential for Hanoi;"
- Lew: "(2) that delays would give those 'working against 23 (78)
a solution' time to 'put the clamps on talks'".
- "Coopers suggestion on rejecting the Marigold 10 ponts." 13 (114)

G) CHINA

- DRV: Chinese "speeches from other quarters" with erroneous 1 (102)
preconditions.
- "on conditions of NVN calling for Chinese help." 5 (106)
- NLF representative in Peking had 'very few contacts' 13 (114)
with the Vietnamese Embassy.
- Oslo-Peking communications problems: "not adequate for 14 (115)
rapidity or security."
- Ngo: Peking 'insecure'. 17 (118)

II DRV: Assessments, Intelligence

- "Hanoi did not take the Romanians seriously" 3 (6)
- Swedish role "dominated by their domestic politics: there 3 (6)
were frequent press leaks on GOS-DRV contacts:"

- Hanoi "not comfortable": Norway "not neutral", "indirectly involved." 4, 17 (7, 118)
- NORTH VIETNAMESE STRATEGY: decisive/final victory; talks/negotiations/settlement.
- Lew: "(1) there was a danger of a leak and that secrecy was essential for Hanoi;" 23 (78)
- DRV: Chinese "speeches from other quarters" with erroneous preconditions. 1 (102)
- "on conditions of NVN calling for Chinese help" 5 (106)
- NLF representative in Peking had "very few contacts" with Vietnamese Embassy. 13 (114)
- Ngo: frequent peace feelers from the American side via American 'stellite countries'". 17 (118)
- Ngo: Peking 'insecure'. 17 (118)
- Ngo: "wished that our contacts continue, in a discreet manner," 19 (120)

III Secrecy

- Swedish role "dominated by their domestic politics: there were 3 (6) frequent press leaks on GOS-DRV contacts:"
- Lew: "(1) there was a danger of a leak and that secrecy was essential for Hanoi;" 23 (78)
- Goldberg speech: Howard (10F67) "exceedingly difficult to negotiate in a goldfish bowl;" "we give our assurance that the secrecy and security of such private explorations would be safeguarded on our side." 30 (85)

- Marigold, "pusuit of Ohio could be embarassing to Algard and ourselves,..." 13-14 (114-115)
- "this among other factors prevents us from describing to GVN what exactly is being discussed." 14 (114)
- Oslo-Peking communications problems: "not adequate for rapidity or security." Ngo: Peking 'insecure'. 14 (114)
- Ngo "wished that our contacts continue, in a discreet manner," 19 (120)

IV POWs

- Algard concern for US POWs; US on Algard raising issue. 1, 5 (102, 106)

V Sources for Positive Themes

- d'Orlandi's "very special view": settlement first. 4 (6)
- NORTH VIETNAMESE STRATEGY: decisive/final victory; talks/negotiations/settlement. 5 (7)
- Lodge saw 2 difficulties with the 10 points. 23 (78)
- Lew: "(2) that delays would give those 'working against a solution' time to 'put down the clamps on talks.'" 23 (78)
- Goldberg: "we do not and should not ask that freedom of expression be curtailed..." 30 (85)
- Loan: previous US escalations against negotiations. 5 (106)
- Concern about Algard misconstruing US as bombing insurance. 13 (114)
- Ngo: "frequent peace feelers from the American side via American 'satellite countries'". 17 (18)
- Ngo on US escalation and negotiations. 18 (119)